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Abstract 
The conflict in Southern Thailand involving the Malay Muslim Group and the Government of Thailand has long 
been the beginning of the integration of the Kingdom of Greater Pattani into the Kingdom of Siam (Thailand). 
The government has made resolution efforts both through dialogue and the military but also never found 
common ground. This condition causes prolonged conflicts to be feared could threaten the stability of security in 
Southeast Asia. Some international actors ranging from countries, international organisations to individuals have 
paid considerable attention to this issue, one of them is Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). This paper attempts to describe 
the role of NU as one of the largest Islamic Organizations in Indonesia in assisting conflict resolution in 
Southern Thailand through the International Conference of Islamic Scholar (ICIS). 
Keywords: South Thailand, second track diplomacy, ICIS 
 
1. Introduction 
Southern Thailand is a country with a multicultural population. The Thai group is the largest group, and 
there are many groups in Thailand with different sociocultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds. Northern 
Thailand is populated by Tibeto-Burman, the group of terms Mon-Khmer and Laos, while Southern Thailand is 
populated by the Malay term group (Nikolov, 2008). 
In the southern region of Thailand called Changwad Chaiden Pak Thai consists of four provinces 
namely Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani and Satun populated by Malay Muslim verses. The area of Southern Thailand 
has a powerful sociocultural attachment to the Malay region as it used to belong to the Greater Pattani kingdom. 
This fact makes the Muslim community in Southern Thailand different from religions, beliefs, customs, 
languages and ordinances of life than the Thai people in general. 
Since the consolidation of the Pattani region into the territory of Thailand under the Anglo-Siam Treaty 
agreement of 1909, the Thai Government created diversity in Thailand into a homogenous country identity 
(Anheier, 2008). Because of different composition as a threat of government stability and national development 
of Thailand (Nikolov, 2008). 
The existing diversity conditions can be a social capital for the pursuit of a positive social 
transformation while still practising religiously and multiculturalism. Instead of creating a positive social 
transformation, it gives birth to various social kinds such as intolerance, discrimination, violence, and even 
social-religious conflict (Satria, 2014). 
Nahdlatul Ulama as one of the Islamic Organizations in Indonesia felt concerned and moved to be able 
to solve the problems that befall the society of Southern Thailand and the Government of Thailand. Through the 
International Conference of Islamic Scholars (ICIS), NU Participating in the process of peaceful endeavours in 
Southern Thailand conflict.  
 In this study, the authors use the concept of second track diplomacy because the actors of diplomacy is a 
not-official organisation. One of the pioneers of second track diplomacy, as a theorist and as a practitioner, 
Joseph Montville, defines the term as “an unofficial, informal interaction between members of adversary groups 
or nations aiming to develop strategies, influence public opinion, and organize human and material resources in 
ways that might help resolve their conflict” (Montville, 1990). Problem-solving workshops represent second 
track diplomacy. Problem-solving workshops are intensive, private, and non-binding meetings between 
politically influential which are not official representatives of conflicting parties drawn from the mainstream of 
their respective communities (Yilmaz, 2004). ICIS as an unofficial by NU with the background of Islam 
Indonesia as rahmatan lil alamin. ICIS welcomed by both parties, the government and the Malay Muslim 
community in South Thailand and able to give its role in the process of resolution through such a meeting with 
both parties, Government of Thailand and Malay Muslim. A proposal was offered to the government and Malay 
Muslim for the benefit of both. 
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1.1 Method: This research in this paper used the library resources and interviewed with qualitative analysis of 
the data. The materials collected for the information were various books, journals, actors and other resources 
related to the topic. 
 
2. Understanding South Thailand Conflict    
Southern Thailand is comprised of 5 border-provinces: Songkhla, Stun, Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. 
The separatist movement of the Patani-Malays concerns the three southernmost border provinces of Thailand, 
Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat. Most of the population are Malay Muslims and speak Malay or Yawi 
(Thnaprarnsing, 2009). Southern Thailand and Northern Malaysia make up a significant cultural, religious, 
ethnic and linguistic frontier. The southern border region is predominantly Malay and Muslim, giving it a unique 
character within a Thai-speaking and mostly Buddhist country. The local language, religion and culture are akin 
to those of the Malay Muslims in neighbouring Malaysia. While Malay Muslims form a majority in the southern 
border area, making up about 80 per cent of the population in the region, they are a small minority in Thailand as 
a whole (Engvall, 2014). 
Historically, the region was part of the ancient Malay kingdom Langkasuka. Under the influence of 
Indian and Arab merchants, the Court of Patani converted to Islam in 1457(Yuniarto, 2004). The subsequent 
centuries saw alternating periods of independence and Siamese suzerainty. The Patani sultanate became a semi-
independent vassal kingdom and tributary to the Siamese Empire of Ayutthaya. The influence of Western 
colonisation finally brought about the complete incorporation into the Siamese state with the Anglo-Siamese 
Treaty of 1909 (Abuza, 2007).  Currently, the Thai government is creating a diversity of existing conditions in 
Thailand that creates a homogenous country identity (Anheier, 2008).  
The existing diversity conditions can be a social capital for the pursuit of a positive social 
transformation that still occurs in religiously diverse and multiculturalism. Instead of creating a positive social 
transformation, it generates a variety of social, religious, and religious societies (Satria, 2014). 
The southern border region has historically been volatile and prone to periodic outbreaks of 
insurgencies. An analysis of the history of relations between the south and the central government in Bangkok 
shows that violent opposition against the state has escalated at times when central control over the area has 
increased, and when systems for local resolution of grievances have been absent. In particular, the latest outbreak 
of violence is associated with the dismantling of a system of governance that had guaranteed relative stability in 
the region since the 1980s (Engvall, 2014). 
Drawing on the historical background of the Southern border region, it is clear that ethnic  
relations have shaped the interactions between the state and local population. The central part of the population 
in the southern border region is ethnically Malay, which is manifested in some unique cultural characteristics 
(Fraser, 1966). To the extent that culture is a defining element of a person’s identity, individuals and groups will 
seek to protect their cultures against outside influences. This reality may lead to resistance and frictions in their 
relations with a state that, to a great extent, is built on Thai ethnic identity (Engvall, 2014).  
As Patani perceives itself as an entity under foreign control, rebellions and uprisings against Siamese 
rule have always been part of its history. With Bangkok’s intensified efforts to disseminate Thai national identity 
in the first decades of the twentieth century, the Patani Separatist Movement started to manifest itself politically. 
Especially the two authoritarian governments of Phibunsongkram (1938–1944 and 1948–1957) enforced strict 
assimilation policies “that adversely affected all facets of Muslim identity and ethnicity, including matters of 
attire, bureaucratic administration, education, judicial settlements and revenue collection” (Tan, 2007). The 
1950s also saw the systematic resettlement of Buddhists from the Northeast of Thailand into the Patani region 
(Abuza, 2007).  
Consequently, three main Muslim separatist groups emerged in Patani, which demonstrates the 
continuing heterogeneity of the insurgents’ political agenda. The first group, Patani National Liberation Front or 
Barisan Nasional Pembebasan Patani founded by Malay aristocrats, was mainly a conservative group 
committed to orthodox Islam. As stated in its constitution, the fundamental political ideology of the BNPP was 
based on the Al-Quran, Al-Hadith and other sources of Islamic law (Che Man, 1990). However, the BNPP was 
divided into several fractions that favoured either independence, autonomy within Thailand, or integration into 
Malaysia (Abuza, 2007). In contrast, the Patani United Liberation Organization or PULO was more pragmatic 
and less religious in its outlook. With a broader base than the BNPP, its declared goal was to achieve an 
independent sovereign Muslim state through armed struggle, which also led to the establishment of its armed 
wing, the Pattani United Liberation Army (PULA). 
The third group, National Revolutionary Front or Barisan Revolusi Nasional was opposed to the 
nationalist agenda of PULO and mistrusted the BNPP’s goal of restoring the feudal Pattani sultanate (Abuza, 
2007). With close ties to the Communist Party of Malaya, it had a much more leftist, anti-capitalist orientation. 
Besides these three main separatist groups, there was a wide range of smaller groups that emerged primarily in 
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the 1970s, but all of them were highly prone to fractionalization and internally divided on issues of ideologies, 
strategies, and aims. During the 1980s and 1990s, the insurgency movement in the South waned partly because 
of increased divisions among all its sub-groups (Haberkorn, 2013).  
Elements of armed struggle have existed in the Patani separatist movement since its beginning. 
However, in 2004 under the government of Thaksin Shinawatra, the conflict was revived with a new dimension 
of violence. Right after several coordinated actions in January 2004 that included raids of army camps, weapons 
and ammunition theft, the burning of schools, and several bomb attacks, the Thai Prime Minister declared 
martial law across the three southern provinces (Haberkorn, 2013). The situation has dramatically deteriorated 
since then. The International Crisis Group estimated in a report from December 2012 that between 4 January 
2004 and 30 November 2012, violent incidents in the southernmost provinces killed 5,473 people and injured 
9,693 (ICG, 2012). By these numbers, the separatist conflict in Patani is one of the most violent, contemporary 
state-internal conflicts in Southeast Asia. 
In early 2013, the Thai government agreed to start peace negotiations with one insurgent group, the 
BRN (Rustici, 2013). Whether or not this step leads to a nascent ‘peace process’ in Patani is yet to be seen. The 
talks had to be repeatedly postponed due to the recent political turmoil in Thailand’s capital (Hunt, 2014). As 
long as political stability in Bangkok is not restored, the insurgency in the South will most likely remain at the 
periphery of the Thai government’s agenda. 
 Thailand’s policies towards the southernmost provinces have been focused predominantly on 
integrating the Patani-Malays into the Thai nation-state. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, the Patani 
people have repeatedly been affected by Thai national policies of forced assimilation, especially regarding 
culture, language, religion, and identity. These policies gave particular attention to education and the role of the 
local Islamic schools (Aphornsuvan, 2007). Besides, Islam as religion has been integrated into the body of Thai 
administrative structures. A system of provincial Islamic councils is headed nationally by the Chularajmontri, 
“the advisor of the King on Islamic affairs” (Dubus & Polka, 2011). This effort to nationalise Islam through 
institutionalisation was aimed at diffusing Malay nationalist tendencies but proved to be futile. The Patani-
Malays do not see themselves represented through this body (Che Man, 1990). Another feature has been the 
notion of facilitating economic development, based on the assumption that socio-economic grievances constitute 
the cause of the separatist insurgency. However, economic development schemes alone have not been successful 
in curbing the grievances of the Patani-Malays. 
 
2.1  The Existence of ICIS 
The International Conference of Islamic Scholars (ICIS) was established in Jakarta on 24 February 2004 
initiatives by KH Ahmad Hasyim Muzadi and Dr N. Hasan Wirajuda. The idea of ICIS formation comes since 
the tragedy of 11th September 2001, the world beginning from the West had been engaged in unhealthy debate 
and suspicion towards Islam. Since the terrorist attack towards the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center, New 
York, Islam was viewed as a religion that condoned terrorism and other forms of violence in the name of faith 
(Slamet, 2014). The tension between the East and West and post-tragedy that killed 3000 people further inflamed 
the animosity instead of garnering effort for cooperation. Which is increasingly heating the tension between both 
sides West and Islam because it has damaged the symbol of world economic power that became the starting point 
for the US government with its allies against global terrorism.  
 The American war campaign against terrorism is an indirect impact on the position of Muslims as the 
party which responsible for every act of terror for years. The high tensions of Islam and the West are also felt by 
all Muslims around the world, including in Indonesia which is the largest Muslim population in the world. The 
various tension and conflicts in the Middle East that mostly comprised of Muslims seemingly justified the views 
of the West that Islam is a region of violence, an ideology of terror and so forth. The media, especially in the 
West were also seen to be supporting such negative views even though each incident had their backgrounds and 
motives; these views were further exacerbated by the lack of information and knowledge, and by other factors 
that were perpetrated by propaganda (Hasan, 2013).  
Observing these challenges, the Ulamas and Islamic Scholars do not remain silent and idle. They 
contribute to finding a solution to resolve these conflict so that Islam may be free from the stigma of being the 
religion of violence. Instead, ulama and scholar need to promote the nature of Islam as the religion of peace as 
rahmatan lil alamin or blessing for the universe. Strengthening the position of Islamic community world full will 
benefit the image of Islam its self.  
NU as the most significant mass organisation of Islam in Indonesia with a mission to promote Islam as 
rahmatan lil alamin is called to relinquish its adherence to world peace based on universal Islamic values. 
Therefore, KH Hasyim Muzadi established a group that would explain to the world that Islam was not as it was 
being accused of being, Islam was anti-violence and anti-terrorism. This group would have the authority to 
conduct its duties, not only by government and the state but also by local and national religious figures and 
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ulama. The ICIS forum that comprises of scholar and ulama’s worldwide attempt to provide an effective and 
efficient explanation to the world that violence is not a part of Islam. Structurally, ICIS was initially under the 
NU as an international organisation is expected to be a venue for NU and world Muslim leaders to respond to 
global issues.  
ICIS is a non-profit, non-ethnic organisation, working together to build dialogue and cooperation 
among Muslim scholars around the world to a peaceful, justice and civilised society. ICIS is registered with the 
United Nations (UN) and has members in 67 countries (Syarkun, 2015). With the pattern of "people to people 
linkage and contact" allows as second track diplomacy. In this case not only the government that strengthens the 
diplomacy of a country but the community. All elements such as scholars, intellectuals, people in business and 
social organisations can also play an active role in strengthening the diplomacy of a country. Thus the state 
policy is taken based on thought and strategy that is mature and at the same time relevant and supported by all 
parties. No matter how small the ICIS decisions can be made as a suggestion to the world to overcome various 
international problems that have occurred so far. In this position too, scholars can play a role in strengthening 
and government diplomacy.  
The ICIS is expected to galvanise such commitment and also produce a movement that contributes to 
multilateralism. The role of Islamic Scholars in an international relation can contribute significantly to 
diplomacy that has been traditionally promoted by the government. The consensus of produced within the ICIS 
can contribute to resolving challenges of international relationships that continue to persist. To this end, the 
ulama play an essential role to promote second track diplomacy. So that reason, ICIS was requested to resolve a 
conflict in the three provinces that were mostly Muslim in South Thailand in March-April 2005, namely Yala, 
Pattani and Narathiwat. The presence of ICIS on occasion was on the special invitation of Prime Minister 
Thaksin Shinawatra and King Bhumibol Adulyadej. 
From then on, NU has been recognised as one of few organisations that are capable of communicating 
with all the parties involved in various sectarian conflicts. The existence of ICIS is increasingly recognised 
worldwide, especially after ICIS is registered and a member of the United Nations as a non-governmental 
organisation, in the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) and Rabithah Alam Islam (World Muslim League) 
based in Mecca. ICIS is increasingly being taken into account to assist in the resolution of various conflicts, not 
only in Muslim-majority countries but also in Muslim minority countries, from regional to global levels. So far 
ICIS has made several agreements to overcome the problems of the Islamic world, with the OIC, the Rabithah, 
the UN, and the World Conference of Religions for Peace (WCRP) (Syarkun, 2015). 
 
2.2 Second Track Diplomacy By ICIS  
KH Hasyim Muzadi as a chairman of Nahdlatul Ulama and general secretary of ICIS feel called and 
concerned to campaign Islam as rahmatan lil alamin and create peace in a country that there is Muslim 
especially in Southeast Asia. To realise the idea of the ICIS, Khariri Makmun explains that “ICIS placed the 
South Thailand conflict as the priority of its attention, so that he expressed his intention to the Embassy of 
Thailand in Jakarta, and welcomed well by the ambassador. Then he visited Thailand twice to assist the 
government of Thailand in creating peace and conflict resolution with the Muslim minority in Southern 
Thailand” (Makmun, 2018). The first meeting was on March-April 2005, and receive by PM Thaksin Shinawatra 
and King Bhumibol Adulyadej and other senior officials. The second meeting was on 11-12 September 2006, a 
week before Thaksin experienced a military coup d Etat (Hasan, 2013). 
ICIS suggested that the Thai government hold an open discussion with the three provinces of Southern 
Thailand. Yala-Pattani-Narathiwat after the military attack of the Krue Se Mosque in Pattani and Killed 84 
Muslim demonstrators in Tak Bai, Narathiwat on October 2004 (Syarkun, 2015). The two bloody events had 
become a grave concern for the Prime Minister and The King, therefore profoundly appreciated the effort of the 
NU to share its experience in maintaining harmony and promoting moderate of Islam. Also, KH Hasyim conveys 
the state of life in Indonesia, which is a multicultural religious background with Pancasila as a unifier so that 
Thailand can take an example from the following events that the Government can facilitate Southern Thailand 
communities that are more accommodating for minority people (Zamhari, 2018). The Muslim in Southern 
Thailand was viewed to share a similar perspective with NU and hence had greater ease in working with NU to 
overcome the ongoing tension.  
Since the first meeting, ICIS had hoped for a conflict resolution in Southern Thailand and appealed to 
parties to resolve the matter as an issue of internal national conflict and avoid labelling it as a Muslim problem. 
In ICIS perspective, this conflict is considered as an international conflict. It will be feared the intervention of 
the countries which involved and allow the transnational Islamic movement to infiltrate in the conflict would 
make the conflict became more complicated such as those conflicts in the Middle East to fight for their interests 
(Syarkun, 2015), and secondly to establish a Thai Muslim Southern Thailand, so as to ensure protection of Thai 
Muslim. Specifically, on the matter of terrorism, ICIS suggested that it be resolved through military means but 
involving the due process of law. Through the courts, they could then understand the anatomy of terrorism in 
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Thailand, be it national or internationally organised. Apart from a security approach, KH Hasyim also suggested 
a social approach, meaning the use of educating, welfare secure and justice (Hasan, 2013). 
Further, ICIS persuaded the Thai Government to appoint an adviser that was familiar with Islam to 
prevent potential misunderstandings, particularly in understanding the critical ritual of Muslims, also to connect 
between the Government of Thailand and Malay Muslim minority, some conflicts that intersect with Muslims are 
triggered by government policies that are not in line with Islam (Zamhari, 2018). KH Hasyim also advised the 
Government to be cautious of infiltrators, such as those conducting arms sale during the time of crisis. There was 
also an invisible hand that needed to be attended to, such as the sensitivity of Islamic teachers to avoid tension in 
communities. ICIS would be willing to dispatch teachers who were able to blend in easily in such communities 
(Hasan, 2013). 
Because NU had experience in communicating with Hindus and Bhudist and is considered to have the 
same characteristics as Thai Muslims (Munim, 2018), KH Hasyim was able to demonstrate to King Bhumibol, 
Prime Minister Thaksin, Foreign Minister Kanthathi also Buddhist Thai leaders such Somdej Phra Buddhacharya 
that Islam was rahmatan lil alamin . Islam promotes the necessity of living in harmony with other religions. 
Although there exist differing views on ritual faith, it was important that Islam and other religion no focus on 
such differences. The Government should resolve lingering differences that caused tension.   
ICIS can penetrate the boundaries that cannot be done by the Government of Indonesia so that ICIS's 
involvement can represent the interests of the government as well as to help create a dispute in Southern 
Thailand. Diplomacy carried out by ICIS could be a significant role in the conflict. Khariri said, “KH Hasyim 
during his visit to Southern Thailand has created a new formulation that can be adopted as a conflict resolution 
by accommodating the needs of the South Thai minority community and vice versa…” (Makmun, 2018). What 
had not been created before was a meeting point because the government takes the approach through military 
violence which was immediately rejected by the Malay Muslim in response to the rebellion.  
Furthermore, Zamhari argues that: “ICIS also facilitates the Muslim Community of South Thailand to 
get scholarship and study in Indonesia especially in Islamic University (UIN). He expects that ICIS will be able 
to imitate the life in Indonesia where Pancasila does not make opposite with the values of Islam and can run 
parallel to democracy. While the students return to their homeland, they can promote an alternative that can be 
adapted to become more moderate in Southern Thai state life. Moreover, also conduct a religious meeting leaders 
by inviting Thai Muslim Scholars to the ICIS office in Jakarta continuously to share and exchange ideas and 
solutions whenever new problems arise in life in Southern Thailand” (Zamhari, 2018). 
 
3. Conclusion 
 The presence of ICIS in Southern Thailand as a form of a non-official second track of diplomacy gives 
colour to the southern Thailand conflict. Through the meeting conducted by ICIS represented by KH Hasyim 
Muzadi for two periods giving such significant influence. The protracted conflict in South Thailand since the 
consolidation of the Greater Patani region into the Thai Kingdom began to find a meeting point after the efforts 
carried out by ICIS included the offer of a solutive alternative to resolve the problems that occurred there. It may 
be quite successful because after ICIS's visit to Southern Thailand, the Thai government began to open itself with 
the Malay Muslim Community and accommodate the aspirations of the Southern Thai Muslim and the conflict 
slowly began to decline. Such a condition especially happened after the government was replaced by Yingluck 
Shinawatra who was more moderate in its policies since August 2011. 
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